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GENDER BALANCE AND THE MEANINGS OF WOMEN IN GOVERNANCE IN 
POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA 
JENNIE E. BURNET 
ABSTRACT 
Across Africa, many countries have taken initiatives to increase the participation and 
representation of women in governance.  Yet it is unclear what meaning these initiatives have in 
authoritarian, single-party states like Rwanda.  Since seizing power in 1994, the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front has taken many steps to increase the participation of women in politics such as 
creating a Ministry of Gender, organizing women’s councils at all levels of government, and 
instituting an electoral system with reserved seats for women in the national parliament. This 
article explores the dramatic increase in women’s participation in public life and representation 
in governance and the increasing authoritarianism of the Rwandan state under the guise of 
‘democratization.’ The increased political participation of women in Rwanda represents a 
paradox in the short-term: as their participation has increased, women’s ability to influence 
policy-making has decreased. In the long-term, however, increased female representation in 
government could prepare the path for their meaningful participation in a genuine democracy 
because of a transformation in political subjectivity.  The lasting repercussions of the 1994 
genocide, the material realities of life in post-genocide Rwanda, and the greater representation of 
females in public life and political office have promoted a great deal of change in cultural and 
social conceptions of gender roles. With these changes has come a greater acceptance of women 
in positions of authority and of women as independent agents in the public sphere. This 
transformation in political subjectivity could prepare women to take a meaningful role in 
government should a real transition to democracy take place in Rwanda. 
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GENDER BALANCE AND THE MEANINGS OF WOMEN IN GOVERNANCE IN 
POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA 
JENNIE E. BURNET 
 Just nine years after a genocide in which at least 500,000 Rwandans, primarily Tutsi as 
well as politically-moderate Hutu, lost their lives, Rwandans went to the polls to elect a national 
parliament.1  In September 2003, the population elected 39 women to the 80 member Chamber 
of Deputies through a tiered electoral system. Rwanda replaced Sweden as the country with the 
                                                 
Jennie E. Burnet (j.burnet@louisville.edu) is Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of Louisville 
(USA). She has been conducting research on gender, ethnicity, and reconciliation in Rwanda since 1996.  This is a 
much revised version of a paper presented in October 2006 at a conference on ‘Gender and democratization in 
societies at war’ at Colgate University.  The author wishes to thank the participants in the conference, notably 
Maureen Hays-Mitchell and Jill Irvine, for their feedback and comments.  In addition, the thoughtful and insightful 
feedback from the anonymous reviewers and editors of African Affairs has been indispensable in improving the 
article and honing the argument.  The author would like to acknowledge financial support from the University of 
Louisville, the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, the University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the United States Institute for Peace, the United States Department of Education, 
and the Institute for the Study of World Politics of the Fund for Peace. 
1 Estimates of how many people died in the 1994 genocide vary widely.  While how many died is irrelevant to 
whether or not the killings in Rwanda in 1994 were genocide, the issue is highly politicized so it is necessary to 
indicate the sources. The number I use here comes from Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide 
in Rwanda (Human Rights Watch, New York, NY, 1999), p. 15. For more on the numbers of dead see Scott Straus’s 
analysis in Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, NY, 2006), pp. 41-64. 
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highest percentage of females in its national legislature.2  Many observers, including journalists, 
the Rwandan President Paul Kagame, the Minister of Gender and Women in Development, 
representatives of international NGOs and the United Nations, heralded the representation of 
women in the Rwandan parliament as the dawn of a new, more ‘peaceful,’ and ‘equitable’ age in 
Rwandan politics.3 In the past 10 years, women’s participation in governance across the 
continent has increased dramatically. Several countries, including Rwanda, Uganda, Namibia, 
and South Africa, have instituted reserved seats for women or quota systems to insure the 
                                                 
2 Gretchen Bauer and Hannah Evelyn Britton, ‘Women in African Parliaments: A Continental Shift?,’ in Hannah 
Evelyn Britton and Gretchen Bauer (eds), Women in African Parliaments (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO, 
2006), p. 1. Since the parliamentary elections in 2003, the Rwandan Parliament has had the highest percentage of 
female representation in the world, ranging from 48.8 percent in 2003 to 42.3 percent in September 2006.  The 2003 
statistics are reported in Timothy Longman, ‘Rwanda: Achieving Equality or Serving an Authoritarian State?’, in 
Hannah Evelyn Britton and Gretchen Bauer (eds), Women in African Parliaments, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
Boulder, CO, 2006), p. 144, and they are widely cited by the Rwandan government in speeches and press 
conferences.  The 2006 statistics are based on the author’s analysis of the Rwandan National Parliament membership 
list published on its website http://www.rwandaparliament.gov.rw/ (25 September 2006). 
3 Longman, ‘Rwanda: Achieving Equality’, p. 133.  For example, see Elizabeth Powley, ‘Strengthening 
Governance: The Role of Women in Rwanda's Transition’, (report, Women Waging Peace / Hunt Alternatives Fund, 
Cambridge, MA, 2003), available at 
<http://www.huntalternatives.org/download/10_strengthening_governance_the_role_of_women_in_rwanda_s_transi
tion.pdf>, (21 January 2008), and see ‘Address by her Excellency President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf at the official 
opening of the Women Parliamentarians International Conference,’ (UNDP-Rwanda website, Kigali, Rwanda, 23 
February 2007) available at http://www.unrwanda.org/undp/Women_conf_Speeches_23-02-2007.pdf, (9 August 
2007).. 
 4 
representation of women.  A growing literature on women in governance has begun to assess the 
impact of women’s increased representation.4 
In this article, I explore two divergent, yet related phenomena in Rwanda. The first is the 
dramatic increase in women’s participation in public life and governance. Since taking power in 
1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Rwandan government have taken many steps 
to increase the participation of women in politics, creating a Ministry of Gender, organizing 
women’s councils at the cell, sector, district and provincial levels, and instituting an electoral 
                                                 
4 See for example, Hannah Evelyn Britton and Gretchen Bauer, Women in African Parliaments (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Boulder, CO, 2006); Hannah Evelyn Britton, Women in the South African Parliament : From Resistance 
to Governance (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, IL, 2005); Anne Marie Goetz and Shireen Hassim, No 
Shortcuts to Power: African Women in Politics and Policy Making (Zed Books, Cape Town, South Africa, 2003); 
Aili Mari Tripp, ‘Expanding “Civil Society”: Women and Political Space in Contemporary Uganda,” 
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 36, 2 (1998), pp. 84-107; Aili Mari Tripp, ‘Gender, Political Participation 
and the Transformation of Associational Life in Uganda and Tanzania,’ African Studies Review 37, 1 (1994), pp. 
107-131; Ali Mari Tripp, ‘The Politics of Autonomy and Cooperation in Africa: The Case of the Ugandan Women's 
Movement,’ Journal of Modern African Studies 39, 1 (2001), pp. 101-28; Aili Tripp, Dior Konate, and Colleen 
Lowe-Morna, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa: On the Fast Track to Women's Political Representation,’ in Drude Dahlerup 
(ed.), Women, Quotas and Politics, (Routledge, London, 2006), pp. 112-37; Aili Mari Tripp, Women & Politics in 
Uganda (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI, 2000); Aili Mari Tripp, ‘Women in Movement 
Transformations in African Political Landscapes,’ International Feminist Journal of Politics 5, 2 (2003), pp. 233-55; 
Drude Dahlerup, Women, Quotas and Politics, (Routledge, London, 2006); Aili Mari Tripp, ‘Women's Movements 
and Challenges to Neopatrimonial Rule: Preliminary Observations from Africa,’ Development & Change 32, 1 
(2001), pp. 33-54; Sylvia Tamale, When Hens Begin to Crow : Gender and Parliamentary Politics in Uganda 
(Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1999). 
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system with gender quotas for the national parliament.5 Discussions about female political 
participation in post-genocide Rwanda tend to assume that increased participation by women will 
lead to greater gender equality and a ‘better,’ more peaceful society, yet these changes have not 
necessarily increased the political power of women or led to more egalitarian notions of 
citizenship. The second phenomenon I will explore is the ways in which the Rwandan state has 
become increasingly authoritarian under the guise of ‘democratization.’ As a result of this 
increasing authoritarianism, female political participation represents a paradox in the short-term: 
as their participation has increased, women’s ability to influence policy-making has decreased. In 
the long-term, however, the increased participation of women could prepare the path for their 
meaningful participation in a genuine democracy. This article is based on ethnographic research 
conducted in urban and rural Rwanda between 1997 and 2007, including over a hundred 
interviews with the leaders and members of women’s civil society organizations, as well as 
ongoing documentary research conducted since 1996.6  
                                                 
5 The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) is the current ruling party in Rwanda.  Founded in Uganda in the late 1980s, 
the RPF grew out of earlier organizations of Tutsi exiles (such as the UNAR) whose intent was to return to Rwanda 
through armed resistance. The RPF ended the genocide in July 1994 by taking control of the country. 
6 The research was conducted over a series of field trips to Rwanda. Data were gathered through focus groups, 
formal interviews, conversations, questionnaires, participant observation, and documentary research among other 
means. In 1997 and 1998, the author made brief field trips (4 months and 3 months).  In 1999 through 2001, the 
author conducted ethnographic research via participant observation in a rural community in southern Rwanda for 12 
months and in a middle class neighbourhood in the capital city for 12 months. During that time, she made numerous 
trips to other regions of the country to conduct additional interviews and gather data.  In 2002, she made two trips to 
Rwanda of six weeks each, and in 2003 a trip of two weeks.  In 2007, she spent 4 weeks in Rwanda conducting 
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‘Democratization’ in Rwanda, old and new 
What foreign diplomats, certain political scientists, and the Rwandan government have 
called ‘democratization’ in Rwanda is predicated on a linear transition paradigm where 
authoritarianism gives way to democracy, human rights abuses to the rule of law, and corruption 
to good governance.7 According to this paradigm, the democratic transition process passes 
through a series of distinct stages: opening, breakthrough and consolidation.8 In diplomatic and 
development circles, and particularly US foreign policy, elections are the fundamental 
component of democratic transition, often to the exclusion of other important aspects of 
democracy defined in political theory.  Under this paradigm, Rwanda’s transition started well 
before the 1994 genocide with a political opening in 1989.  
In 1989, several political parties, which had been dormant under the single-party state 
and dictatorship of President Habyarimana, re-emerged and began demanding political 
liberalisation.  Along with a few civil society organizations that were also pushing for change, 
their pleas coincided with increasing pressure in the international community for authoritarian 
states to democratize. In many cases, this pressure tied political reforms to aid money, a 
particularly sensitive issue for the Rwandan government, as the country was almost entirely 
                                                                                                                                                             
interviews and focus groups with women’s organizations, women members of government, and women leaders of 
civil society organizations. 
7 Filip Reyntjens, ‘Post-1994 Politics in Rwanda: Problematising “Liberation” and “Democratisation” ’, Third World 
Quarterly 27, 6 (2006), pp. 1103-17.  See also Thomas Carothers, ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm,’ Journal of 
Democracy 13, 1 (2002), pp. 5-21. 
8 Alicia Phillips Mandaville and Peter P. Mandaville, ‘Introduction: Rethinking Democratization and Democracy 
Assistance,’ Development 50. 1 (2007), pp 5-13. 
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dependent on foreign aid. The movement by CSOs was consolidated in September 1990 with the 
publication of a memorandum, ‘For multiparty politics and democracy’.9 
On 1 October 1990 the country entered a civil war when the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF) attacked Rwanda, and the civil war strongly influenced the political transition.  Founded 
in Uganda in the late 1980s, the RPF’s stated intention was to liberate the country from President 
Habyarimana’s dictatorship. The civil war continued throughout the early 1990s until 
Habyarimana, facing dramatic losses as well as continued pressure from donors, was forced to 
the negotiating table. The 1993 Arusha Peace Accords brought an official end to hostilities and 
outlined a transition plan to move the country to multiparty politics and democratic elections.   
The transition, which had been limping along, was brought to a dramatic and violent halt 
in April 1994 when Habyarimana was killed when his plane was shot down by unknown 
assailants. Immediately, Hutu extremists took control of the government and perpetrated a 
genocide against Tutsi and others defined as ‘enemies’ of the state.  At the same time, the RPF 
resumed the civil war against the government army, which was also involved in the genocide. 
The genocide ended when the RPF took military control of the majority of the territory, driving 
the Hutu-extremist government, militias, and army into exile, along with nearly two million 
civilians.   
On 19 July 1994, the RPF named a transitional government, which it called the 
‘Government of National Unity,’ whose composition reaffirmed the RPF’s commitment to power 
sharing outlined in the Arusha Accords.  The RPF announced that the transitional government 
would remain in power for five years.  As part of its reconstruction efforts, the Transitional 
Government undertook an ideological programme called ‘national unity and reconciliation’ to 
                                                 
9 Filip Reyntjens, L'afrique Des Grands Lacs En Crise. Rwanda, Burundi 1988-1994 (Karthala, Paris, 1994), p. 305. 
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build a ‘New Rwanda,’ a nation of one people who refused the ‘genocidal ideology’ of the past.10 
By 1995, however, it appeared that the RPF might not make good on its promises. Reports of 
extrajudicial executions, ‘disappearances,’ and several massacres of civilians emerged 
throughout late 1994 and 1995. In August 1995, several prominent Hutu politicians, including 
Hutu members of the RPF, fled into exile for fear for their lives. Hutu elites continued to flee 
through the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 2000, a wave of departures among Tutsi genocide 
survivors began.11 
In 1998, the RPF had announced that the transition period would be extended five 
additional years to ensure the country’s security and a peaceful democratization process.  The 
Party justified its position by citing multiparty politics as one of the principal causes of the rise 
of Hutu extremism and the 1994 genocide. This second round of ‘democratization’ was officially 
launched in 2001 when district level elections were held and a Constitutional Commission was 
appointed.  In 2003, the new constitution was approved by national referendum in May, 
presidential elections were held in August, and parliamentary elections in September.   
                                                 
10 Jennie E. Burnet, ‘Whose Genocide? Whose Truth? Representations of victim and perpetrator in Rwanda’, in 
Alex Laban Hinton and Kevin O’Neill (eds), Genocide: Truth, Memory and Representation (Duke University Press, 
Durham, NC, in press).
 
11 Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: the Search for Security and Human Rights Abuses’, (report, Human Rights 
Watch, New York, NY, 2000), available at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/rwanda/Rwan004-
04.htm#P121_15300> (20 January 2008) and <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/rwanda/Rwan004-
06.htm#P182_27970> (20 January 2008). pp. 121, 182. 
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Since this most recent ‘democratization’ process began in 1998, the RPF-regime has 
become more authoritarian.12  This so-called transition ‘was in fact tightly controlled and 
resulted in greater consolidation of power by the RPF, even as it gave an illusion of power 
distribution’.13  In the elections, RPF officials carefully selected candidates, and threatened or 
intimidated anyone else seeking office.14  Local and national elections have been orchestrated 
from the ground up with the RPF’s pre-selected candidates assured of winning.15 This 
consolidation ‘has been accompanied by an increasing intolerance for independent expression 
and political dissent’.16 The RPF regime has systematically suppressed independent civil society 
organizations (particularly local human rights organizations) and destroyed any potential 
opposition political parties.17   
                                                 
12 Filip Reyntjens, ‘Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship,’ African Affairs 103 (2004), p. 411; 
Filip Reyntjens, ‘Post-1994 Politics in Rwanda’; Longman, ‘Rwanda: Achieving Equality’. 
13 Longman, ‘Rwanda: Achieving Equality’, p. 146. 
14 Ibid., p. 147; International Crisis Group, ‘ “Consensual Democracy” in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Evaluating the 
March 2001 District Elections,’ (Report, International Crisis Group, Brussels, Belgium, 2001).  
15  The orchestrated nature of elections is an open secret in Rwanda today.  In interviews conducted in 2007, 
numerous citizens confirmed that while elections usually have a minimum of three candidates, the outcome is 
always predetermined.  One interviewee recounted a story of an election in an umudugudu (‘village,’ the smallest 
administrative subdivision in Rwanda following the administrative reorganization of January 2006) in the capital, 
Kigali, where the citizens failed to elect the pre-selected candidate.  The elections official who was overseeing the 
election declared, ‘No, no, no! You haven’t done it right. Let’s try again to see if you can do what we’ve asked.’ 
16 Longman, ‘Rwanda: Achieving Equality’, p. 146. 
17 Among the first human rights organizations to be suppressed was the umbrella, CLADHO, which was infiltrated 
and dismantled from within in 1996.  The most recent was LIPRODHOR, which was the only local human rights 
organization to report critically on the RPF regime and RPA.  In 2003, the members of Parliament denounced 
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To quell protest from the diplomatic and international aid communities, the RPF has 
dressed its increasingly authoritarian governance in democratic clothing by promoting its 
policies as the best methods to ensure ‘security’ and ‘good governance’. In addition, the regime 
has increased the participation of all citizens in the political system through an elaborate local 
level administration, as well as a complicated, tiered electoral system for the Parliament and 
presidency.  Finally, the regime has increased the representations of under-represented groups, 
particularly women and youth.   
The RPF and women in governance 
Although the RPF was made up of Rwandan exiles in Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, and 
Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) as well as Rwandans from inside the country that 
left to join their fight, its core leadership grew up in refugee camps in Uganda.  As Longman 
notes, ‘The Ugandan origins of the RPF have deeply influenced its policies since taking power, 
including its policies on women’s rights and inclusion.’18 President Paul Kagame and other RPF 
insiders had been officers in Museveni’s National Resistance Movement in Uganda and their 
                                                                                                                                                             
LIPRODHOR as ‘promoting divisionism’ and a ‘genocidal ideology’ and called for a parliamentary commission to 
investigate it and several other NGOS. Virtually all of LIPRODHOR’s leadership and senior members fled Rwanda 
in June, July or August of 2003. While LIPRODHOR still exists, its current members and staff are members of the 
RPF who toe the party line. In 2001, the RPF regime quashed an initiative by former President (and former RPF 
member) Pasteur Bizimungu to found a new political party, charging him and his associates with treason.  In 2003, 
the MDR was completely banned when a parliamentary commission found it guilty of promoting divisionism and a 
genocide ideology.  This nail in the coffin lid followed the internal destruction of the party begun by Anastase 
Gasana in 1999. 
18 Longman, ‘Rwanda: Achieving Equality’, p. 140. 
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experiences influenced the organization and tactics of the RPF.19  The policies of Museveni and 
the NRM have continued to influence RPF policy in the post-genocide period.  RPF policies vis-
à-vis the inclusion of women in governance seem closely modelled on those of Museveni and the 
NRM.  Museveni and the NRM took a two pronged approach in Uganda: (1) they mainstreamed 
women within the NRM and appointed women to important posts in the cabinet and Supreme 
Court, and (2) they set aside reserved seats for women in the legislature.20 The Ugandan election 
structure is based on a complex combination of direct and indirect elections and an electoral 
college system.21  Unlike Rwanda, however, Uganda has much greater freedom of expression 
and a more robust independent press.22  
Similar to the NRM, the RPF mainstreamed women from the beginning, including them 
in both the political and armed wings of the Front during the armed struggle from 1990-1994. In 
this way, it distinguished itself from the opposition parties and the state MRND party in Rwanda.  
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 Aili Mari Tripp, ‘Uganda: Agents of Change for Women's Advancement?,’ in Hannah Evelyn Britton and 
Gretchen Bauer (eds), Women in African Parliaments, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO, 2006), p. 112. 
21 Ibid., pp. 120-1. 
22 Freedom House ranked Accountability and Public Voice in Uganda 3.99 out of 7 (where 0 is the least free and 7 is 
the most free) in 2006, whereas for Rwanda in 2005 it was only 1.48 out of 7. For Uganda, see Nelson Kesfir, 
‘Country Report – Uganda’ in Sanja Tatic and Christopher Waller (eds), Countries at the Crossroads (Freedom 
House, New York, 2007) available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&edition=7&ccrpage=31&ccrcountry=127 (21 January 
2008). For Rwanda, see Sara Rakita, ‘Country Report – Rwanda’ in Sanja Tatic and Christopher Waller (eds), 
Countries at the Crossroads (Freedom House, New York, 2007) available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&edition=2&ccrpage=8&ccrcountry=105 (21 January 08). 
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Since taking power, the RPF has ‘publicly demonstrated a strong commitment to expanding 
rights and representation for women’.23 In the aftermath of the genocide, the RPF took numerous 
steps to increase female participation in governance.  Following its victory, it appointed women 
to high profile positions in the new government, as ministers, secretaries of state, Supreme Court 
justices, and parliamentarians. As part of the reorganization of the executive branch, they created 
the Ministry of Gender, Family, and Social Affairs (MIGEFASO).  For the first time, Rwanda 
had a ministry dedicated not just to women, but also to gender. The ministry was reorganized in 
1999 and renamed ‘the Ministry of Gender and Women in Development’ (MIGEPROF).24 The 
ministry’s central mandates have been to integrate gender analytical frameworks into all policies 
and legislation, to reinforce knowledge of gender analytical matrices within state structures 
(including local administrative structures, the ministries, legislature, and judiciary) via training 
and education, and to promote gender equity.25   
 In early 1998, MIGEPROF organized ‘nationwide elections’26 for representative 
leadership among women at all levels of government administration, from the cell up to the 
                                                 
23 Longman, ‘Rwanda: Achieving Equality’, p. 141. 
24 In French, Le Ministère du Genre et la Promotion Féminine (MIGEPROF), and in Kinyarwanda, ‘Minisiteri 
y’Iterabmere ry’Umunyarwandakazi.’  The Kinyarwanda title of the Ministry is literally, ‘The Ministry for the 
Promotion of the Female Rwandan.’ 
25 Judithe Kanakuze, ‘Le Rôle De La Femme Dans Le Processus De Démocratisation Au Rwanda’ (paper presented 
at the Séminaire sur l'observation électorale par la société civile rwandaise / POER, Kigali, Rwanda, August 5, 2004 
2004), p. 4. Interviews by the author 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001. 
26 It is debatable whether the term, ‘elections,’ is appropriate as they were held in open-air plenaries where women 
were asked to queue behind the candidate ‘of their choice.’  With the degree of social, political, and military control 
in Rwandan society, it is doubtful that anyone’s choice was freely made.  Nonetheless, this style of ‘election’ 
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national level.27  Initially called ‘grassroots women structures’ and later renamed ‘women’s 
councils,’ the official purposes of the women’s councils were manifold, including to promote 
women’s interests in development, to advise local governance structures on women’s issues, and 
to teach women how to participate in politics. In fact, the women’s councils were the first to 
elect members of Parliament in 1998 when they elected two Women’s Representatives.28 The 
women’s councils continued to elect these representatives until the transition to the new 
structures outlined in the 2003 Constitution.  The women’s councils were joined by local 
leadership representing the entire population elected nationwide in 1999.  
Yet, in 1998, most rural Rwandans (male or female, and even including some women 
who are members of them) did not understand the mission of most of the women’s councils.29  
Outside the few communes where NGOs were implementing women-in-development projects 
and used the structures to mobilize women, these structures existed in name only, or simply 
                                                                                                                                                             
became the standard for local level elections when ‘democratization’ was initiated by the Transitional Government 
in 1999.  
27 One cell is composed of roughly 100-200 households. Rwandan administrative structure is extremely hierarchical 
and penetrates to the most basic level.  The levels from smallest to largest are: ten houses (nyumbakumi), cell 
(akagare), sector (umurenge), district (akarere), province (intara), and national (igihugu).  The names of certain of 
these designations were changed in English and Kinyarwanda with the administrative reorganizations of December 
2000 and January 2006.. 
28 The 1998 elections for women’s leaders were the model for local elections in 1999.  In both elections, the 
population queued publicly behind the candidate ‘of their choice.’  The panel of candidates was selected minutes 
before the voting.  There were no campaigns and no public debate about the candidates. 
29 The exception being certain positions that mirrored the appointed administrative positions (responsable and 
conseiller) that they replaced.  
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served as a channel to disseminate government directives from the top to the bottom. They were 
mere symbols of inclusion, which appeared to be in line with foreign aid ideas, rather than 
‘grassroots structures’ feeding the will of the people upwards in the governance hierarchy. 
Cognisant of the lack of clear purpose for the women’s councils, in 1999 the Ministry announced 
the implementation of women’s development funds to be distributed through these structures as 
loans to finance income-generating projects.  These funds were intended to penetrate to the 
lowest level (cell) of the administration, that is, directly to the ‘grassroots.’ In most communities 
where I conducted interviews between 1999 and 2001, local women did not know these funds 
existed or whether they were functioning in their communities. Generally, only a few elite 
women (who also held positions with the women’s grassroots structure at the commune level) 
knew anything about the funds. 
Perhaps the area where the RPF’s pro-woman policies are most evident is in the 
legislative branch. Before the resumption of the civil war in 1994, few women had ever served 
as parliamentarians (see Table 1). The first Transitional National Parliament (TNP) appointed in 
1994, included 10 women, including 3 of the 13 RPF deputies.30  Between 1994 and 2003, 
members of the TNP were appointed by the Political Party Forum (a body widely perceived as a 
mechanism for RPF dominance) after being nominated by the political parties included in the 
government.  Over time, the number of women in parliament increased (see Table 1). By 1999 
over one quarter of parliamentarians were women and before parliamentary elections in 2003, 
women held 25.7 percent of seats in parliament.31 The 2003 Constitution in Rwanda set aside 30 
percent of seats in the parliament and all other decision-making bodies for women. President 
                                                 
30 Longman, ‘Rwanda: Achieving Equality’, p. 144. 
31 Ibid. 
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Kagame and key ministry officials have ‘repeatedly articulated strong support for women’s role 
in government and society’.32 [Table 1 goes here] 
These revolutionary steps to increase female representation in governance have brought 
many accolades for President Paul Kagame and the RPF.  In January 2007, Kagame was selected 
as the winner of the 2007 African Gender Award.33  He was lauded for his leadership in efforts 
to integrate ‘women into the reconstruction process,’ to ‘fight against gender-based violence,’ 
and to protect ‘the rights of women and girls to equal education, economic development and 
ownership of property, particularly in rural zones’.34 In February 2007, the Forum of Rwandan 
Women Parliamentarians hosted an international conference entitled, ‘Gender, Nation Building: 
The Role of Parliaments’.35  Supported by the United Nations Development Programme, this 
conference brought over 400 delegates from around the world to Kigali to discuss the role of 
parliaments in promoting gender equality as a fundamental component of development.36 Among 
the distinguished participants in the conference was Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the 
                                                 
32 Ibid., p. 141. 
33 Kagame received the award on 12 December 2007 at a ceremony in Dakar, Senegal. ‘African Gender Forum and 
Award,’ African Gender Award website, December 2007, available at http://www.africangenderawards.org/ (21 
January 2008). 
34 ‘2007 Award Laureate,’ African Gender Award website,  January 2007, available at 
http://www.africangenderawards.org/award1.html, (8 August 2007). 
35 ‘Background Paper: “Walking the Talk”,’ UNDP-Rwanda website, 22 February 2007. 
http://www.unrwanda.org/undp/Women_Conf_22-23_02_2007.html, (8 August 2007).  
36 ‘Women Parliamentarians International Conference under the theme “Gender, Nation Building and the Role of 
Parliaments”,’ UNDP-Rwanda website, 23 February 2007.  
http://www.unrwanda.org/undp/Newsroom_story11.html, (8 August 2007). 
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first African woman ever elected president, whose speech to the plenary highlighted the 
usefulness of the RPF’s pro-woman policies and its relatively new role as host to international 
conferences: 
[government policies have encouraged] women not only to partake of the democratic 
process but also to be full participants in the governance of their societies and countries. 
This has facilitated networking at the grass-roots, local, national and international levels 
thereby creating an appropriate political environment that continues to nurture what you 
can proudly call your home grown democracy. … In light of such achievements against 
the backdrop of your recent political past, we congratulate and encourage you for having 
risen up to the challenge of creating a network that has focused on a process of nation 
building underpinned by a gender perspective.37   
Beyond an ideological commitment to promoting women’s rights, the RPF’s pro-woman policies 
gain a great deal of support for the RPF-regime from key decision-makers and influential 
personalities, such as President Sirleaf, in the international community.  Influential international 
delegates to the numerous conferences in Kigali rarely know the details of recent Rwandan 
political history, and thus they develop a one-sided view of the RPF as courageous defenders of 
the Rwandan people who stopped the genocide, promoted female equality, and embarked on a 
path to democracy.  As a result, many delegates leave Kigali as strong believers in and defenders 
of President Kagame and the RPF-regime.  
                                                 
37 ‘Address by her Excellency President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf at the official opening of the Women Parliamentarians 
International Conference,’ UNDP-Rwanda website, 23 February 2007. 
http://www.unrwanda.org/undp/Women_conf_Speeches_23-02-2007.pdf, (9 August 2007).  
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Beyond these influential passers-by, the RPF’s pro-woman policies, as well as its efforts 
to ‘modernize’ and ‘rationalize’ Rwandan society and the economy, give members of the 
diplomatic corps in Kigali liberty to overlook the regime’s authoritarianism and human rights 
abuses.  When human rights observers present evidence of serious human rights violations, such 
as extrajudicial executions or ‘disappearances’, diplomats often respond with an attitude of ‘at 
least, it’s not genocide,’ and then enumerate RPF successes, such as promoting women’s rights.38 
Women in civil society 
In post-genocide Rwanda, women’s organizations have taken a leading role in rebuilding 
society and in helping women rebuild their lives.  The proliferation of women’s organizations 
since the late 1990s in Rwanda ‘seems nothing short of remarkable’.39  Women’s organizations 
seemed to step ‘in to fill a social void in the post-genocide period’; they helped to meet women’s 
basic needs (food, clothing and shelter) and make up for the missing kin and social support 
systems destroyed in the genocide. 40  While none of these changes happened overnight, 
women’s organizations have indeed served the needs of thousands of individual women.41  The 
growth of women’s organizations, as well as their mission to help the most vulnerable people in 
society (women and children), positioned them as among the most active sector of civil society 
between 1994 and 2003.   
                                                 
38 Interview with international human rights observer, May 2007. 
39 Catherine Newbury and Hannah Baldwin, ‘Confronting the Aftermath of Conflict:  Women's Organizations in 
Postgenocide Rwanda,’ in Krishna Kumar (ed.), Women and Civil War:  Impact, Organizations, and Action, (Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO, 2001), p. 77. 
40 Bauer and Britton, ‘Women in African Parliaments: A Continental Shift?,’ p. 16. 
41 See Chapter 6 in Jennie E. Burnet, Genocide Lives in Us : Amplified Silence and the Politics of Memory in 
Rwanda (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Dissertation Services, 2006), pp. 175-204. 
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Newbury and Baldwin attribute the proliferation of women’s organizations in Rwanda to 
four key factors: the dire crisis women faced in the aftermath of the genocide, the historical 
vigour of women’s grassroots organizations and farming cooperatives, monetary and technical 
support provided by the international community, and the policies of the Rwandan government.42  
As detailed above, women had little choice but to recreate their lives from ‘less than nothing,’ as 
more than one female genocide survivor described it to me.  Yet the women’s movement in 
Rwanda predates the genocide.  
Early in the post-colonial period, the government of the First Republic supported social 
centres (foyers sociaux) for women in each prefecture.  These centres focused on the needs of 
rural women, such as literacy and health education, but they also provided opportunities for 
leadership to the educated women who staffed them.43  While the government of the Second 
Republic largely excluded women from governance or key posts in the ministries, farming 
cooperatives and grassroots-level church-related groups grew in number, thanks in part to the 
influx of international funding and technical assistance aimed at rural development.44  
Following the Third United Nations Conference on Women, held in Nairobi in 1985, a 
women’s movement began to emerge in Rwanda.45 Several national women’s organizations were 
founded in the late 1980s, including Duterimbere, a women’s banking and micro-lending 
cooperative modelled on the Grameen Bank, Haguruka, an advocacy group for women and 
children’s legal rights, and Réseau des femmes œuvrant pour le développement rural, an 
                                                 
42 Newbury and Baldwin, ‘Confronting the Aftermath of Conflict’. 
43 Ibid., p. 99. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Kanakuze, ‘Le Rôle De La Femme Dans Le Processus De Démocratisation Au Rwanda’, p. 2. 
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organization that provided technical assistance to rural women’s organizations. Following 
pressure from the nascent women’s movement, the Habyarimana government created the 
Ministry for the Promotion of Women and the Family, whose primary mandate was to promote 
economic development to improve the status of women and children, in 1992.46  The first woman 
prime minister in Rwanda, Agathe Uwilingimana, a member of the MDR opposition party, was 
appointed in 1993.47 
Following the genocide, several women’s civil society organizations restarted their pre-
war activities.  Many organizations began by taking a census of members and locating surviving 
members both inside Rwanda and in exile. In late 1994 and early 1995, they then sent members 
to the refugee camps and cities in eastern Zaire and Western Tanzania to convince exiled 
members that it was safe to return home.48 In their appeals, the emissaries underscored the need 
for everyone to help rebuild the country. An unforeseen benefit of the women’s micro-lending 
cooperative, Duterimbere, was that individual accounts at the organization’s savings bank 
remained intact unlike accounts in some of the major commercial banks, which had been looted 
during the genocide.49  These small savings accounts allowed many women and families to 
                                                 
46 Ibid. 
47 Prime Minister Uwilingimana was killed in the first days of the genocide in April 1994 so that she could not speak 
out against it. Although a Hutu, she was among the top priorities on the Presidential Guard’s roster of people to 
eliminate.  She was killed along with 10 Belgian peacekeepers that were part of the UNAMIR mission.   
48 Burnet, Jennie E. and Mukandamage, Jacqueline, 'Réseau des Femmes Œuvrant pour le Développement Rurale:  
An Organizational Case Study', (Organizational case study report, United States Agency for International 
Development, Washington, DC 2000). 
49 Interviews with account holders, Kigali, Rwanda, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000. 
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restart small businesses destroyed during the war.50 In addition, the organization’s lending 
programme gave widows the capital necessary to start new businesses or rebuild their deceased 
husbands’ enterprises. 
Several new women’s organizations were founded in response to the needs of specific 
categories of women. One of the most visible was the Association of the Widows of the April 
1994, known by its French acronym AVEGA-Agahozo, which began as an umbrella organization 
for groups of genocide widows that had formed at the grassroots level.  The national organization 
gave the genocide widows greater advocacy power and allowed international NGOs and bilateral 
aid organizations to channel humanitarian and development assistance to genocide widows and 
their children, known to be extremely vulnerable groups with dire economic, medical, and 
psychological needs.  Other women’s organizations were imported to Rwanda by long term 
exiles who returned to Rwanda after the RPF victory in 1994.  One such organization, Club 
Mamans Sportives, a sports club that encourages urban middleclass and elite women to ‘get 
active,’ was founded in Burundi and imported to Rwanda by returnees.51    
One of the key players in the post-genocide period was the women’s umbrella 
organization, Pro-Femmes Twese Hamwe.  Originally founded in 1992, Pro-Femmes grew from 
a base of 13 member organizations in the early 1990s to 35 by the end of 1996 and 41 by 2006.52 
Pro-Femmes undertook ambitious development and advocacy initiatives, coordinating efforts by 
constituent organizations. In the late 1990s, Pro-Femmes’ leadership included a diverse group of 
                                                 
50 Ibid. 
51 Interviews, Kigali, Rwanda. 2002, 2007. 
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Rwandan women, including, Hutu, prominent Tutsi widows-of-the-genocide, and Tutsi returnees 
from long-term exile in Uganda, Burundi, and DR Congo.  Despite the challenges of finding 
consensus, the organization focused on issues important to all women, like development, 
peacebuilding activities and inheritance rights. In 1996, the organization launched its Peace 
Action Campaign, aimed at promoting a culture of peace. Véneranda Nzambazamariya, president 
of Pro-Femmes Twese Hamwe in the mid to late 1990s, was one of the key initiators of the Peace 
Action Campaign; she was recognized for her peace activism and service to women with the 
Millennium Peace Prize for Women by UNIFEM and International Alert in 2001.53 The 
members of Pro-Femmes, along with the Minister of Gender, Family and Social Affairs, led the 
advocacy initiative for the inheritance law, an initiative I explain in more detail below.54 
International aid and technical assistance made key contributions to the growth of 
women’s civil society organizations. Beginning in the early 1990s, the United Nations entities 
and bilateral aid organizations began targeting women and children for assistance in war torn 
societies. Rwandan women and women’s organizations benefited greatly from this targeted aid.  
The international community provided millions of dollars of funding targeting women’s issues 
and women’s organizations.  Over $3 million dollars of USAID emergency assistance was 
directed through an experimental programme called Women in Transition (WIT).55 The 
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programme sought to make small (in USAID terms) grants to local women’s associations across 
the country.  Between 1995 and 1999, the WIT programme made over 1,800 grants to 
associations in eleven of twelve prefectures of Rwanda.56  Many international NGOs developed 
and supported gender training programmes (notably Oxfam) for government officials and 
leadership training for women elected to office (Women Waging Peace – the Hunt Alternative 
Fund).  
Despite these significant contributions, the Rwandan women’s movement in the mid to 
late 1990s should be viewed as being principally indigenous rather than simply driven by outside 
forces.  While the Rwandan women’s organizations would not have been able to make as much 
of an impact without international aid, the majority of the local organizations did not allow the 
agendas of international partners to drive their work plans. Many local women’s civil society 
organizations were scrambling to negotiate the complex international aid systems so that they 
could become partners of international NGOs or direct recipients of international aid grants.57 
Beyond the financial impact of the international community, the international women’s 
movement provided inspiration and technical knowledge to Rwandan women (for instance, the 
various International Conferences on Women).  Female leaders of civil society organizations in 
Rwanda were frequently sent to international conferences or educational exchanges where they 
met women from other developing nations who faced similar challenges. They returned 
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energized by their discussions with these ‘third world’ feminists.58 In addition, they networked 
with feminists from Europe, North America, and Australia who had the resources to provide 
continuing assistance to Rwandan women’s organizations. 
Collaboration between women in government and civil society: the 1998 ‘inheritance law’ 
 In the 1990s in Rwanda, particularly after the genocide, women’s organizations had 
greater space in which to manoeuvre and advocate for women’s rights than many other civil 
society organizations, especially than local human rights or indigenous rights organizations.  At 
the time, women’s organizations were largely perceived as apolitical by the government and the 
RPF. Since protecting women’s rights and promoting women’s involvement in the public sphere 
and governance were core components of RPF policy, the government did not step in to curtail 
the work of women’s organizations as it did with human rights organizations.   
To understand the unique position of women’s NGOs in the late 1990s in Rwanda, it is 
important to understand something about the RPF’s conceptualisation of the relationship 
between civil society and the state.  RPF leaders envision civil society as an extension of, rather 
than as a counter-balance to, the state.  While this vision of civil society is antithetical to current 
political and democratic theory, it is a logical extension of the RPF’s African nationalism, which 
insists on ‘national unity’ and rejects critiques of government policy by outsiders (such as the 
United Nations or European or American governments) as ‘neo-colonialism’.59 My first direct 
contact with this vision of civil society came in 2000 when I taught Public Administration 
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students at the National University of Rwanda.  Several final-year students were examining 
various aspects of Rwandan ‘civil society,’ or what they were calling civil society, in their senior 
theses (mémoires).  I was surprised to learn that these projects were looking at local level 
governance structures elected in 1999 rather than at local NGOs, church groups, or agricultural 
cooperatives.  Rwandan professors at the University did not challenge this definition of state 
apparatuses as ‘civil society’; in fact, they perpetuated it in their lectures, in their mentoring, and 
in their oversight of senior theses. From this perspective, the ‘correct’ relationship between civil 
society and the state is one where civil society serves the ends of the state.   
The RPF vision of civil society became codified into law in 2001, when the Transitional 
Government passed a law governing non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Rwanda, 
including local and international NGOs as well as religious institutions. Among other things, this 
law gave government ‘authorities broad powers to control the management, finances, and 
projects of local and international nongovernmental organizations.’60 Under the law, NGOs and 
their missions must be in line with government policy and their work plans must be executing 
aspects of the government’s strategic plan in areas related to the NGO’s mission. NGOs who do 
not comply can be (and are) denied registration or renewal of their registration. The women’s 
movement in Rwanda has been successful when it has aligned itself with the RPF’s vision of 
civil society. 
An important piece of legislation passed in Rwanda in 1999 exemplifies the collaboration 
between women in government and civil society.  The legislation, commonly referred to as ‘the 
inheritance law,’ was an amendment to the civil code which set up three matrimonial property 
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regimes and made it legal for women to inherit property.61  Although referred to as the 
‘Inheritance Law,’ this law also gave women full legal rights to enter into contracts, seek paid 
employment, own property in their own names and separately from their husbands, and open 
bank accounts without the authorization of their husbands or fathers.  Passed by the National 
Assembly in November 1999, the law dramatically reconfigured customary inheritance practices 
and gave girl-children equal rights with boy-children in matters of inheritance. For the 
inheritance bill, women’s organizations, the Ministry of Gender and Women in Development 
(MIGEPROF), and the Forum of Women Parliamentarians, a caucus of women parliamentarians 
created in the mid-1990s, worked closely together in formulating policy, crafting the text of the 
bill, and lobbying decision-makers in other ministries and within the inner circle of the RPF, 
referred to as the akazu, to pass the controversial bill.      
This successful collaboration between women in civil society and government occurred 
while the government was not yet a nominal ‘democracy’ and still a power-sharing coalition 
between political parties whereby all members of the national government were appointed rather 
than elected.  According to most observers it was a dictatorship, controlled by the inner circle of 
RPF leaders.  So, how and why did women succeed in passing this legislation if there was no 
democracy?  The first, and perhaps most important reason, was that then Vice-President Kagame 
and key members of the RPF, including several prominent RPF women (like Rose Kabuye and 
Aloysia Inyumba) recognized the need to protect the rights of the thousands of genocide widows 
and orphans and thus supported the policy.  Second, female leaders in civil society, in the course 
of their organizing and providing services to members, had gained enough experience to know 
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how to manipulate the state, even a repressive state, to achieve a common goal.  As Bauer and 
Britton have noted, ‘rather than demonizing the state as an entity of oppression, women are 
increasingly moving from resisting the state to using the state’ in Africa.62 Among these key 
leaders were many women who had been involved in civil society organizations and political 
parties in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Thus, they knew how to influence policy under a 
totalitarian state where the levers of power are hidden from public view.  Third, these female 
lobbyists couched their advocacy to male audiences in terms of family-oriented, ‘motherist’ 
politics by appealing to the men’s sense of justice for their own mothers’ and daughters’ rights.63 
Fourth, in 1998 the TNP and ministries still included members of political parties other than the 
RPF, including the historically Hutu MDR opposition party. Thus, a diversity of views and 
interests in Rwandan society was represented in the government at that time. Since the women’s 
movement in Rwanda was unified on the inheritance issue, they were able to appeal to 
representatives of different political parties with a common message. Following the resignation 
of several prominent Hutu politicians in late 1999 and early 2000 (e.g., Prime Minister Pierre-
Celestin Rwigema and President Pasteur Bizimungu) and the dismantling of the MDR political 
party in 2003, the view of a narrower segment of Rwandan citizens were represented in the 
government.  Finally, the presence of women in government (in the ministries and parliament), 
along with their attendant ‘stamp of approval’ from the power holders who had appointed them, 
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meant that women had access to decision-makers throughout the government.64  Although 
women constituted less than 25 percent of parliament at the time, the presence of women in 
parliament and elsewhere allowed both women in government and in civil society to advocate for 
the inheritance bill in all corners of the government.65  The success of women in these advocacy 
efforts suggests that limited forms of democratic participation are possible under an authoritarian 
government.   
Emasculation of the women’s movement 
 The Rwandan women’s movement continued to succeed in gaining protections of 
women’s rights and participation in government through the Constitutional process from 2001 
through 2003.  Judithe Kanakuze, a long-term leader in the Rwandan women’s movement, was 
appointed to the Constitutional Committee and took an active role in ensuring inclusion of 
numerous gender-sensitive clauses in the constitution.  The most notable of these was the 
establishment of quotas of 30 percent for the inclusion of female representatives in all decision-
making bodies.  As a result, women held 48.8 percent of positions in the National Parliament 
following national elections in 2003. 
With all the women in governance in Rwanda today, one might think that the situation of 
women would be improved.  Yet, as Longman argues, it is questionable whether the increased 
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representation of women in executive, legislative, and judicial branches has any meaning given 
the increasingly authoritarian nature of the Rwandan government.66  
In the short-term, the women’s movement in Rwanda has been set back for three main 
reasons. First of all, the net result of so many women being included in all levels of government 
is that the most vibrant leaders of women’s civil society organizations left to take positions in the 
government.  According to one woman leader, 
When the time came for elections in 2003, everyone was saying to us, ‘You women keep 
yelling about women’s rights and including women in government.  Now you’ve gotten 
what you want so you need to come and be candidates.’ Since 2003, most of the key 
women leaders left for the government.  Those of us who did not join the government had 
to turn our attention to other things, like going back to school or taking care of our private 
affairs.67 
Thus, many women’s civil society organizations were faced with a vacuum in leadership. The 
women who stepped in to take their places were either not as well equipped to advocate on 
contentious women’s issues (such as land rights) or were more interested in personal gains, 
particularly those who stepped into well-paid staff positions. Many of the younger women who 
stepped into these positions were better educated than the women they replaced since they had 
university degrees.68 Although these younger women were better educated, they lacked the 
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critical experiential knowledge of how to lobby a non-democratic government and how to 
negotiate the levers of power. Furthermore, many of these women were RPF cadres so they were 
more interested in implementing policy than influencing it.  
An example of the impact of this transition on women’s civil society organizations is the 
self-destruction of one of the oldest women’s organizations, Réseau des femmes œuvrant pour le 
développement rural, between 2003 and 2007.  Many of the ‘old-guard’ who had been members 
since before the genocide resigned their positions in 2003 to join the government while others 
went back to school. When the new Executive Secretary began embezzling funds and taking 
credits in the organization’s name, no one noticed.  By the time members realized what had 
happened, the organization was several millions of Rwandan francs in debt, had lost its 
headquarters building, and had to lay off its entire staff.  
A final reason the women’s movement has been set back is that women have not found a 
unifying issue to rally around since the promulgation of the inheritance law in 1998. Land tenure 
and land use are among the most volatile political issues in Rwanda today, and the present 
situation poses the risk of widespread violence.69 Given that the vast majority of Rwandan 
women are subsistence farmers and that women, and female-headed households in particular, are 
among the people most vulnerable to losing access to land, it would seem that land rights would 
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be an obvious rallying issue for the Rwandan women’s movement.70 However, the women’s 
NGOs and MIGEPROF have refused to define land as a women’s issue since the initial steps to 
develop the land policy and law in 1997. When lobbied by LandNet to address the draft land 
policy and laws, representatives of MIGEPROF said that land is an issue for all Rwandans, not 
just women.71 As a result of LandNet’s advocacy efforts, undertaken without support from 
women’s civil society organizations or MIGEPROF, the final version of the 2005 Land Law 
stated that the Inheritance Law guaranteed female equality vis-à-vis property, including land.  In 
practice, however, women face substantial obstacles when attempting to actualize their 
inheritance or land rights, and the 2005 Land Law did not offer women any relief and may in fact 
make them more vulnerable.72  
Given the volatility of the issue, it is likely that women’s NGOs and women in 
governance did not define land as a women’s issue in order to avoid coming into conflict with 
the interests of the RPF and the akazu.  Furthermore, since the majority of women for whom land 
is a life and death issue are poor, rural women, the primarily middle-class and urban elite, 
women’s civil society organizations and their membership may not have perceived land as a 
women’s issue since it was not an issue directly relevant to their leaders.  The failings of the 
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women’s movement in Rwanda vis-à-vis the land bill demonstrate the limited impact that 
increased female participation in governance has had since 2003.   
Increased female participation in governance has had a number of negative consequences.  
First of all, across the African continent, the engagement of more women in the legislative, 
judicial, and executive branches of government, as well as in the grassroots administrative 
structures, has resulted in a loss of human capital from the vibrant civil society organizations.73  
While younger women with university educations are taking their places, the movement of 
experienced women into government has left women’s organizations with fewer experienced 
female leaders.74 Given the difficult political terrain, the loss of experienced leaders lessens the 
effectiveness of advocacy on hot button issues, like land use, as the ‘new’ civil society leaders do 
not have the savoir faire to manoeuvre behind the scenes.   
Second, increased female participation in governance risks hindering the cooperation 
between women in civil society and women in office—cooperation that was vital in the creation 
and passage of the Inheritance Bill.75  In Rwanda, some women feel as if their colleagues who 
have been elected to office, accepted a government post, or joined the RPF political party are no 
longer engaging in activism on behalf of women’s interests.76  Since 2001, female 
Parliamentarians have voted for bills which destroyed the one remaining opposition party, which 
gave the President and the RPF powerful tools to root out dissension, which eliminated an 
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autonomous civil society, and which eliminated public space for criticism of the government, the 
RPF, or their policies.   
Another risk of female legislative representation is that it ‘may be used by political 
leaders and parties to legitimize their agendas’.77  According to some analysts, the RPF regime 
has used female-friendly policies to achieve its own ends.  Having designated women’s 
representatives in Parliament and other branches of government is a way of ensuring loyal RPF 
representatives who are not officially ruling party representatives. Tripp has documented an 
analogous situation across the border in Uganda.78  Many Rwandans I spoke with in 2007 voiced 
the sentiment that Members of Parliament do not do anything except collect their salaries and 
enjoy the other benefits of their position (such as a stipend, a loan for a car, and money for 
petrol) and show up occasionally to ‘vote’ on issues that have already been decided within the 
RPF. While the factual accuracy of this portrait is difficult to document, it is apparent that both 
female and male representatives in government who fail to toe the RPF line are forced to 
resign.79 
Transformation in Political Subjectivity 
Although the female-friendly policies of the 2003 Constitution may not prove to be a 
boon to women in the short term, the prospects for meaningful input by women in the long term 
remain good.  As Aretxaga argues ‘political processes … are en-gendered’ even in contexts 
                                                 
77 Bauer and Britton, ‘Women in African Parliaments: A Continental Shift?’, p. 22. 
78 Tripp, ‘Uganda: Agents of Change for Women's Advancement?’, pp. 130-1. 
79 Interviews, Kigali, Rwanda 2007 and United States of America 2005, 2006. 
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where women are excluded from the real politics.80 Female engagement with political processes, 
whether formal (as in the case of Rwanda) or informal (as in the case of Northern Ireland in the 
1970s), transforms not only the political processes but also the constitution of women’s 
identities, subjectivities, and agencies.  Thus, the long-term potential benefit of greater female 
participation in governance in Rwanda is the transformation of women’s political subjectivity 
and Rwandan culture.  
The presence of women in the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government 
marks a significant departure for Rwandan society and the collective cultural imagination. These 
women’s representatives have transformed what is possible for ‘daughters’ [abakobwa] and 
‘wives’ [abagore]. According to custom, daughters and wives were subordinate to (and by 
corollary protected by) fathers (or brothers) and husbands.  A wife could speak publicly on 
behalf of the family in her husband’s (or father-in-law’s) absence, yet she was perceived as his 
second and not as an independent, autonomous agent.  Whether customary gender roles have 
always relegated wives to a secondary position behind husbands is up for debate.  As Oyewumi 
argues in the case of Yorubaland, the application of the category ‘women’ in Rwanda, and the 
resulting perception of females as inferior in post-colonial Rwanda, may be largely a product of 
the colonial encounter.81  Whether the subordination of females to males is entirely a result of 
colonialism, the work of Jefremovas makes it clear that colonialism weakened the customary 
                                                 
80 Begoña Aretxaga, Shattering Silence:  Women, Nationalism, and Political Subjectivity in Northern Ireland 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 1997), p. 6. 
81 Oyeronke Oyewumi, The Invention of Women:  Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses 
(University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN, 1997). 
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powers and rights of daughters and wives.82  Yet, in Rwanda today wives and daughters are 
accorded the right to speak publicly, whether or not they are elected officials or government 
functionaries.  While there are still those Rwandans (male and female) who speak against female 
equality and who label independent or outspoken women as ‘loud’ or ‘loose,’83 these voices are 
no longer met with social silence or tacit approval. Instead, they are pointed out as ‘un-evolved’ 
points-of-view, which hearken back to the ‘Old Rwanda.’  
Second, the inclusion of women in governance has changed public perceptions of women 
in governance roles and opened the doors to greater individual freedom for women in other 
aspects of their lives. In recent years, several scholars, including myself, have argued that violent 
conflict, and the attendant disruptions in gender relations, can provide ‘new opportunities to 
articulate debate about gender politics as well as for individual women to live in a different 
way’.84  This situation is true of Rwanda in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide when Rwandan 
women found themselves in a difficult situation.   
                                                 
82 Villia Jefremovas, Brickyards to Graveyards: From Production to Genocide in Rwanda (State University of New 
York Press, Albany, NY, 2002) pp. 84-5. 
83 For an in depth exploration on the uses of ideal types of the ‘timid virgin’ and ‘virtuous wife’ to control women’s 
agency in pre-genocide Rwanda, see Villia Jefremovas, ‘Loose Women, Virtuous Wives and Timid Virgins:  
Gender and Control of Resources in Rwanda,’ Canadian Journal of African Studies 27, 3 (1991), and Jefremovas, 
Brickyards to Graveyards, pp. 97-108. 
84 Donna Pankhurst, ‘Women and Politics in Africa: The Case of Uganda, in Karen Ross (ed.), Women, Politics, and 
Change, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2002), p. 127. See also Drude Dahlerup, Women, Quotas and 
Politics (Routledge, 2006), Krishna Kumar, 'Civil Wars, Women, and Gender Relations:  An Overview', in Krishna 
Kumar (ed.), Women and Civil War:  Impact, Organizations, and Action (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), pp. 
5-26, Spyros A. Sofos, 'Inter-Ethnic Violence and Gendered Constructions of Ethnicity in Former Yugoslavia', 
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The genocide and civil war brought about a dramatic demographic shift in the 
composition of Rwandan society.  In the immediate aftermath of violence in 1994, the population 
had become predominantly female.  Human Rights Watch estimated that 70 percent of the 
population inside Rwanda in 1995 was female.85  As internally displaced persons and refugees 
returned home, this demographic shift slowly began to equalize.  A demographic survey 
conducted in late 1996 and early 1997 established that the overall sex ratio (number of males per 
100 females) for the Rwandan population was 86, meaning that women constituted 53.7 percent 
of the adult population, an abrupt shift from the estimate only 1-2 years earlier.86  While the 2002 
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the Fast Track to Women's Political Representation', in Drude Dahlerup (ed.), Women, Quotas and Politics (London: 
Routledge, 2006), pp. 112-37, Meredeth Turshen and Clotilde Twagiramariya, What Women Do in Wartime : 
Gender and Conflict in Africa (New York: Zed Books, 1998). 
85 Human Rights Watch, ‘Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence During the Rwandan Genocide and Its Aftermath,’ 
(Report, Human Rights Watch, New York, NY1996). At that time, the vast majority of the Rwandan population 
lived in exile in refugee camps in eastern Zaire and western Tanzania. They had fled Rwanda from July-October 
1994 when the RPF took control of the Rwandan territory.   
86 Office National de la Population (ONAPO), ‘Final Report, Socio-Demographic Survey 1996,’ (Ministry of 
Finance and Planning, Kigali, Rwanda, 1998), p. 18. In late 1996 and early 1997, the refugees returned en masse 
when the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Liberation du Congo (AFDL) and the Rwandan Patriotic 
Army (RPA) attacked the camps to force them to close.  The AFDL was a purportedly indigenous rebel movement, 
led by Laurent Kabila and backed by the Rwandan and Ugandan militaries, that attacked Zaire in 1996 with the goal 
of overthrowing Mobutu Sese Seko’s government.  The RPA was the military wing of the post 1994 Rwandan 
government.  With the approval of the new constitution in 2003, it was renamed the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF).  
It is unclear to what extent the ONAPO study included Rwandans returning from exile en masse in late 1996 and 
1997.  Yet, a significant part of this jump could be attributed to the large influx of predominantly ‘Tutsi’ exiles who 
 36 
Rwandan National Census reported the overall sex ratio as 91.25 (meaning that 52.2 percent of 
the total population was female, compared with 51.2 percent in 1991), the sex ratio for people 17 
years or older was 87.07 nationwide, a notably larger gap.87 Although these overall figures may 
not sound very dramatic, in specific age brackets in specific communities, the absence of men is 
much more notable.  For example, in my own census of a rural community in Butare prefecture 
in 2001, adult women comprised 55.6 percent of the adult population.  Yet in the 40-50 year age 
bracket women were 65.4 percent.88 The 2002 Rwandan National Census reported the lowest sex 
                                                                                                                                                             
returned to Rwanda beginning in early 1995 (once the RPF was securely in power) after a lifetime in exile. It is 
unclear to what extent the ONAPO study included Rwandans returning from exile en masse in late 1996 and 1997. 
Yet, a significant part of this jump could be attributed to the large influx of predominantly ‘Tutsi’  exiles who 
returned to Rwanda beginning in early 1995 (once the RPF was securely in power) after a lifetime in exile.  
Although far less dramatic than the situation in 1994-1995, this demographic imbalance has grave consequences for 
single women and widows.  Very few have the opportunity for a real marriage.  For the 20-24 year old age group the 
sex ratio drops to 71, and for the 25-29 year old age group it is only 69 (ONAPO 1998:18). 
87 Republic of Rwanda, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, and National Census Commission, ‘Report on 
the Preliminary Results: The General Census of Population and Housing: 16-30 August 2002,’ (Government of 
Rwanda, Kigali, Rwanda, 2003), pp. 17, 39 (Table 19). 
88 I defined ‘adult’ as over 20 years of age. The actual percentages for all of these studies could be even higher as 
many women with husbands in prison report their husbands as members of the household in surveys.  Similarly, 
women are often reluctant to indicate that they are heads of household even when their husbands are not present 
(whether because they are dead, in prison, missing, or polygamous and residing with another wife.) Polygamy is 
illegal in Rwanda (and condemned by the churches), but it has some social recognition and precedence in certain 
Rwandan traditions. 
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ratio (77.94) for those 17 years of age or older in Kibuye prefecture.89 As a result of these 
demographic changes, many ‘wives’ and ‘daughters’ found themselves without the ‘traditional’ 
protection of ‘husbands’ or ‘fathers’. 
Beyond these dramatic demographic changes, the harsh material realities of post-
genocide Rwanda created an entirely new context for kin and social relations. The civil war and 
genocide produced over two million refugees along with hundreds of thousands more internally 
displaced persons. The economic and physical infrastructure had been destroyed at every level.  
Many survivors had nothing left—no clothes to wear or food to cook, much less a pot in which 
to prepare it. Survivors, particularly women, found that ‘traditional’ ways of life and modes of 
being were no longer possible.   
Following the genocide, many Rwandan women found themselves as heads of household, 
whether because their husbands were dead, in exile, in prison, or in military service with the 
RPF. According to Rwandan custom, women rely on men for access to the means of livelihood.90  
Yet in the aftermath of the genocide, women took on new roles in the domestic and public 
spheres that Rwandan society had previously not ascribed to them.  These roles included 
everyday tasks customarily taboo for women, like putting roofs on houses, constructing 
enclosures around houses, or milking cows, and additional roles in society, such as head of 
                                                 
89 Republic of Rwanda, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, and National Census Commission, ‘Report on 
the Preliminary Results: The General Census of Population and Housing: 16-30 August 2002,’ p. 39 (Table 19). 
90 Burnet and Rwanda Initiative for Sustainable Development, ‘Culture, Practice and Law: Women's Access to Land 
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household or government administrator.91 Many Rwandan women took on primary economic 
responsibility for their households because their husbands were either absent or unable to do it.  
Prior to the genocide, Rwandan law forbid Rwandan women to engage in commercial activities, 
enter into contract, or seek paid employment without authorisation from their husbands.92  In 
practice, many husbands (and even most husbands in the cities) allowed and even encouraged 
their wives to work because it benefited the whole family, but the husbands often controlled the 
women’s salaries or profits from commercial endeavours.  Female-owned businesses were 
vulnerable, in practice and by law, to plunder by their husbands (whether to support their own 
businesses, their drinking, or even their mistresses) or to complete takeover.93 
With the disruption in gender relations, some women found the freedom to pursue careers 
or commercial activities without these risks.  Yet, this ‘opportunity’ to challenge customary 
notions of womanhood and women’s roles in the family and community should not be portrayed 
too rosily, as some journalists and feminist policy analysts have tended to do.  For peasant 
women in rural areas, the absence of husbands increased the burden of crushing poverty as well 
as social isolation. Farming without their husbands’ labour resulted in a heavier workload and 
lower yields, as well as reduced social status in the community where no one had the ‘time’ to 
hear about or assist with ‘widows’ problems’ as more than one widow described it to me.94  The 
                                                 
91 Interviews with members of Duhozanye, a widows-of-the-genocide association in Save commune, November 
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92 HRW, ‘Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence During the Rwandan Genocide and Its Aftermath,’ p. 22. 
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lack of income from husbands’ labour in the cash economy left widows and prisoners’ families 
destitute without the necessary cash to pay for health care or school fees.  For middle class and 
elite women, their new found ‘freedom’ was bittersweet.  Even the most successful business 
women lamented the heavy burden of bearing sole financial responsibility for themselves and 
their children—not to mention the social, emotional, and psychological consequences of 
widowhood or single motherhood.95 As time has gone on, the most difficult burden for many has 
been solitude. Many female genocide survivors report that the perpetrators who killed their 
husbands and children spared the women by saying, ‘You will die from solitude’.96 In 2007, a 
widow-of-the-genocide whose two surviving children were away studying abroad wrote me, ‘I’m 
becoming old, and I’m bored a lot here in [town where she lives].  I’m beginning to feel bad 
being alone.’ The understatement of her phrasing only emphasized her suffering. Another 
widow, who had had a series of intermittent, clandestine relationships with married men and 
even a Roman Catholic priest, stated her physical needs to me in surprisingly straightforward 
declaration, ‘I burn for a man.’ Her expression of physical solitude in a Western idiom sounded 
like a direct challenge to Rwandan ideals of chastity and emotional reserve for ‘daughters’ and 
‘widows’. The possibility that she could imagine stating her desires so matter-of-factly, in a way 
so antithetical to Rwandan cultural ideals of femininity, points to a transformation in 
subjectivity.  
                                                                                                                                                             
crops (especially coffee). Réseau des femmes œuvrant pour le développement rural, ‘Profil Socio-Économique De 
Da Femme Rwandaise’,  (report, Réseau des femmes œuvrant pour le développement rural, Kigali, Rwanda, 1991). 
95 Interviews by author, various locations in Rwanda between 1997 and 2003. 
96 Anne Aghion, ‘Gacaca: Living Together Again in Rwanda?’,  (Documentary film, First Run/Icarus Films, New 
York, NY, 2002). 
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A third effect of the inclusion of women in governance structures is the increase of the 
numbers of women with leadership and governance experience.  Even if their leadership and 
governance skills are acquired in a non-democratic system, the same skills will be relevant 
should the RPF open the doors to more genuine democratization with meaningful competition 
between political parties, a free media, and a civil society with the capacity to counterbalance 
state power.  Thus, in the long-term greater female representation could pave the way for 
meaningful participation of women in a more democratic political system because a great deal of 
change in cultural and social conceptions of gender roles manifested in the acceptance of women 
in positions of power (like Mayors, local government authorities, or Gacaca judges) as well as 
the acceptance of women as independent agents in public fora (such as witnesses in Gacaca 
hearings or speakers in government council meetings at all levels). 
Conclusions 
The lasting repercussions of the 1994 genocide, the material realities of life in post-
genocide Rwanda, and the greater representation of women in public life and political office 
have promoted a great deal of change in cultural and social conceptions of gender roles. With 
these changes has come a greater acceptance of women in positions of authority and of women 
as independent agents in the public sphere. Through its policies, the RPF has linked gender 
equality to nationalism.  As a whole, the top-down gender initiatives of the RPF have had a 
positive impact on gender equality and have transformed the collective cultural imagination: 
‘wives’ and ‘daughters’ have a wider range of socially circumscribed agencies in the ‘New 
Rwanda’, and they are conceiving of themselves and their agencies in the world differently.  
Increased female political participation in Rwanda represents a paradox in the short-term: as 
their participation has increased, women’s ability to influence policy-making has decreased. In 
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the long-term, however, increased female representation in government could prepare the path 
for their meaningful participation in a genuine democracy because of a transformation in 
political subjectivity.   
This case of an authoritarian, single-party state pushing for greater gender equality 
highlights a few key points relevant to political theory and democratization studies as well as to 
the increasingly female political representation across Africa.  First of all, even in an 
authoritarian state, policy can be influenced by interest groups (such as women) who have access 
to decision-makers and who have the political savvy to operate the hidden levers of power. 
Second, the emphasis on elections in lieu of other aspects of democratic governance may reduce 
rather than increase the capacity of interest groups to shape policy. Third, top-down gender 
initiatives, even when implemented by authoritarian regimes, can lead to transformations in 
political identities, subjectivities, and agencies.  Finally, these transformations in political 
subjectivity may pave the way for effective engagement in democratic governance should it 
emerge. 
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Table 1. Women in Rwandan Parliament (1961 – 2008) 
 
  Total Members Female Members 
  N N % 
1961 First Legislative Assembly‡ 44 0 0 
1965 Legislative Assembly‡ 47 1 2.1 
1969 Legislative Assembly‡ 47 0 0 
1973 No legislative assembly existed‡ NA NA NA 
1982 National Development Council‡ 64 4 6.3 
1983 National Development Council‡ 70 9 12.9 
1988 National Development Council‡ 70 11 15.7 
1994 Transitional National Parliament‡ 70 8 11.4 
1994 Transitional National Parliament$ NA 10 NA 
1999 Transitional National Parliament$ NA NA <25 
2002 Transitional National Parliament* 74 17 23 
2003 Transitional National Parliament$ NA NA 25.7 
2003 Parliament (both houses)$ 106 48 45 
2003 Chamber only$ 80 39 48.7 
2006 Parliament (both houses)† 104 44 42.3 
2006 Chamber Only† 78 35 44.8 
2008 Senate€ 26 9 34.6 
2008 Chamber¥ 77 36 46.8 
2008 Parliament (both houses) €,¥ 103 45 43.6 
 
Notes: Bolded text indicates composition after national elections. 
‡ According to Aloys Muberanziza, 'L'acces des femmes aux fonctions parlementaires au 
Rwanda', Dialogue, 231 (2003), pp. 3-25. 
$ According to Timothy Longman, ‘Rwanda: Achieving Equality’, p. 144. 
* According to Elizabeth Powley, ‘Strengthening Governance: The Role of Women in 
Rwanda's Transition', p. 27.  
† Compiled from Rwanda Parliament website, Electronic document, available at 
http://www.rwandaparliament.gov.rw/, (5 October 2006). 
€Compiled from “Abasenateri” Umutwe wa Sena website, available at 
http://www.rwandaparliament.gov.rw/SE/rw/compo/index.htm (21 February 2008). 
¥Compiled from “Abadeputi” Umutwe wa deputi website, available at 
http://www.rwandaparliament.gov.rw/CH/rw/compo/index.htm (21 February 2008). 
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